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INTRODUCTION
The Presumption of Innocence
Anne Ruth Mackor & Vincent Geeraets
The presumption of innocence (PoI) is considered to be a fundamental principle
of criminal law. Over the past decades, however, the emphasis on the rights of
suspects and defendants has given way to a more instrumental view of criminal
law as a means to reduce risk and attain safety. One can think, for example, of
recent Acts on Terrorism that do not require ‘suspicion’ but merely ‘indications’
of a terrorist crime, thereby lowering the level of suspicion required for investiga-
tive activities in the pre-trial phase; of plea-bargaining that has been introduced
in various legal systems; of the verdict of the European Court of Human Rights
(ECtHR) in Salabiaku v. France where the Court allows for presumptions of fact or
of law to operate in the trial phase; of the possibility of review after wrongful
acquittals and of convicts who face special measures after serving their sentence
in the post-trial phase, to name just a few examples. Such an instrumental
approach puts fundamental principles such as nulla poena, ne bis in idem, nemo
tenetur, in dubio pro reo, nullum crimen sine culpa, as well as the PoI under pressure.
These developments make reflection on the PoI an urgent affair. Reflection is
even more important because the principle seems to have such an elusive nature.
What exactly is the PoI? Notice how wide-ranging the above examples are. Are
they all connected to the, or rather a, PoI? Or should we restrict application of
the PoI to the defendant in the trial phase and let other principles do the job
in pre- and post-trial phases, where citizen and suspect, and acquitted and
ex-offender, are the key players? In other words: is a broad interpretation of the
PoI that has a bearing on all these examples desirable? And how is the PoI actually
interpreted and applied in legal practice? These questions are at the heart of this
special issue.
Antony Duff, a leading expert in criminal law theory and the philosophy of pun-
ishment, provides the main contribution to this issue. A central theme within
Duff’s philosophy is the idea that trial and punishment should be understood
communicatively. When the prosecution has a prima facie case that someone did
what he is accused of having done, the defendant should answer by providing
counter-evidence or a justification or an excuse; if he cannot provide a rebuttal,
he should accept that punishment is his due. Therefore the defendant is required
to appear in person and expected, though not forced, to enter a plea. The punish-
ment, in turn, communicates that what the offender did is wrong and it asks him
to repent, or at least to pay his debt, for his criminal actions.
Duff utilizes the idea of communication to account for some salient features of
the practice of criminal law. For example, trial and punishment only make sense
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in relation to a reason-responsive agent; the accused should thus be fit to plead.
The communicative approach also makes clear the importance of the principle of
proportionality. If punishment is to be an expression of the wrongness of the
offender’s actions, it has to be proportionate to the seriousness of the crime and
responsibility for that crime. Finally, the PoI too makes sense within the idea of
communication. To ask the defendant to respond to allegations is only fitting if
the prosecution has first shown that there is a reasonable suspicion that he
indeed did what the prosecution claims he has done.
In his present contribution, Duff is concerned with the question whether the
(or a) PoI has a role to play beyond the confines of the criminal trial. He answers
the question in the affirmative. Although Duff explicitly states that his account
flows from common law systems, he is not so much interested in the meaning of
the PoI in particular legal systems, but rather provides us with an analysis that
purports to show that the PoI, or rather many presumptions, can be discerned in
a wide range of contexts. The PoI plays a role not only during the trial, but also
prior to the trial as well as once a sentence has been served or where a defendant
is acquitted. According to Duff, a modest kind of civic trust that entails that it is
only appropriate for a citizen to be burdened with the role of defendant, i.e., to be
put on trial and asked to answer, if there is sufficient evidence of his guilt, is basic
to citizenship. Duff utilizes a broad interpretation of the PoI, combined with the
idea of civic trust, to criticize, inter alia, selectively applied precautions, pre-trial
detention and post-punishment preventive measures.
The five other articles in this special issue respond in different ways to Duff’s
analysis.
Thomas Weigend and Magnus Ulväng offer an analysis of the nature of the PoI
and subsequently question the idea that a broad PoI is warranted and necessary.
Weigend’s main concern is that a broad PoI lacks a precise meaning. The function
of the strict PoI is to restrict the powers of the state. Postulating a broad principle
of civic trust seems to be empirically unwarranted, because many people actually
break the law. Moreover, such a principle is redundant as civil liberties can do the
job that Duff intends a broad conception of PoI to fulfil. Magnus Ulväng first
analyses the nature of the PoI and argues that it has less weight than Duff seems
to assume. It is not a rule of obligation or a principle, but rather a rule of thumb.
Subsequently, Ulväng too argues that we do not need a broad PoI; rather, many of
the purposes of the PoI can be served by a principle of fairness that already
applies within substantive criminal law.
Both Geert Knigge and Lonneke Stevens criticize Duff, arguing that his analysis is
not consistent with legal practice, thus challenging Duff’s claim that his account
flows from positive law. Knigge agrees with Duff that many different presump-
tions with different rationales underlie the verdicts of the ECtHR, but then criti-
cizes Duff’s claim that a principle of civic trust unifies them. According to Knigge,
if anything, respect for dignity rather than a principle of civic trust underlies the
verdicts of the ECtHR. Lonneke Stevens discusses the presumption of innocence
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in relation to the Dutch practice of pre-trial detention. Empirical research shows
that judges use pre-trial detention as an instrument to realize incapacitation and
pre-punishment. Thus, as far as pre-trial detention is concerned, Duff’s PoI is
hardly more than an ideal that has only limited normative effect in legal practice.
Alwin van Dijk is the only author who adopts and even broadens Duff’s already
broad interpretation of the PoI. According to Van Dijk, the important discussion
is that which questions whether interferences with the PoI are justifiable and, if
so, on what grounds. Subsequently, Van Dijk argues that although it is often
thought that most PoI interferences are justified on consequentialist grounds, the
retributivist anti-PoI duty to punish the guilty might be the worst enemy of inno-
cents.
In his reply to his critics, Duff further elucidates his reasons for talking of differ-
ent – moral rather than legal – presumptions of innocence outside the criminal
trial. He argues that even if our aim is only to understand the PoI as it figures in
our current legal practice best rationalized we cannot restrict ourselves to legal
theory. We must take political theory into account and deal with the proper aims
of the state and the relationship between state and citizen. Central to this rela-
tionship are the questions of when and how the role-bearer’s innocence is chal-
lenged or denied.
At the moment there is a broad interest in the PoI, and rightfully so. We are
therefore very pleased to present a challenging interpretation of the PoI and five
critical reactions to it. We hope that the articles in this issue can function as a
thought-provoking contribution to the continuing debate about one of the most
fundamental principles of our criminal law systems.
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